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zeroing in on what the controversy reveals about Saudi politics. The article concludes that Star Academy was
so polemical in Saudi Arabia because the show subverted the religious bases of Saudi social order by
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Drawn from a bigger project (Kraidy, 2009, in press), this article examines the heated debate triggered by the pan-Arab 
reality show Star Academy in Saudi Arabia. It examines how controversies over authenticity spawned by popular culture 
crystallize broader social and political struggles. The article focuses on Star Academy as a contentious media event, 
describing and analyzing various Saudi reactions to Star Academy, and zeroing in on what the controversy reveals about 
Saudi politics. The article concludes that Star Academy was so polemical in Saudi Arabia because the show subverted the 




‘‘The great struggles in the Arab world today,’’ wrote the Moroccan feminist sociologist Fatima Mernissi, 
‘‘concern [the] attitude towards Western symbolic capital, in particular the fight for authenticity (al-asala), 
which now figures prominently in all current debates, whether these be political, social, or economic’’ 
(Mernissi, 1987, p. 83). In that context, Star Academy, a popular Arabic-language reality show broadcast by 
the Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation (LBC) via satellite from Lebanon since December 2003, provoked an 
intense controversy in Saudi Arabia. Institutions, clerics, royals, journalists, intellectuals, conservative 
militants, and liberal activists in the kingdom entered the fray by issuing religious rulings, enacting policies, 
writing newspaper columns, submitting letters to the editor, or appearing on talk-shows. Although various 
social and political issues were at stake, the controversy revolved around the notion of authenticity. 
 Drawn from a bigger project (Kraidy, in press), this article examines the heated debate triggered by 
Star Academy in Saudi Arabia. Following Mernissi’s insight, it examines how controversies over authenticity 
spawned by popular culture crystallize broader social and political struggles. After a brief explanation of Saudi 
politics, the Lebanese factor in pan-Arab media, and the importance of women in Saudi media policy, this 
study focuses on Star Academy as a contentious media event, describing and analyzing various Saudi reactions 
to Star Academy, and zeroing in on what the controversy reveals about Saudi politics. The article concludes 
that Star Academy was so polemical in Saudi Arabia because the show subverted the religious bases of Saudi 
social order by promoting women’s agency, featuring cultural hybridity and individuating authenticity. 
 
Methodology and research questions 
 
This study combines institutional research and critical discourse analysis (CDA). 
Institutional research focuses on production and programming strategies, based on primary sources such as 
interviews with managers, producers, directors, journalists (Turow, 2006), in addition to secondary research 
and polling data. Extensive multisited fieldwork included in-depth interviews with Star Academy senior staff 
and LBC management in Adma, Lebanon, with journalists and editors at Saudi-owned pan-Arab newspapers 
Al-Hayat and Asharq Al-Awsat in London, and with corporate researchers in Dubai who track the Saudi media 
market, conducted mostly between March 2004 and August 2005. (A separate list of 16 ‘‘personal 
communications’’ is provided in the interest of scholarly transparency, even though APA style requires 
interviews to be cited only in-text). No fieldwork was conducted on Saudi soil because initial consultations 
determined that this research was too controversial to be granted access. Selected from a larger data-set to 
eliminate redundancies, print sources used herein include the text of a fatwa, books by Saudi intellectuals (Al-
Bishr, 2007; Al-Ghaddhami, 2005; Al-Hamad, 2001)—to this author’s knowledge not available in English and 
never before discussed in communication scholarship—news stories, op-eds, drawn primarily from Al-Riyadh 
(eight items), a national newspaper based in the capital and reflecting Saudi establishment opinion, Asharq-Al-
Awsat (five items), Al-Hayat (1 item), Arab News (seven items), an English-language daily based in Jidda, in 
addition to Al-Quds Al-‘Arabi (three items), also London-based but editorially critical of the Saudi regime. Of 
these 30 Arabic language primary print sources, 13 have a women’s byline, 13 are penned by men, and 4 have 
no byline. Audio-visual data include all episodes of the first season of Star Academy, various promotions for 
the show, and a talk-show segment dedicated to the controversy. All translations from Arabic and French are 
the author’s and an experienced Arab media researcher scrutinized this article to check facts and verify 
translation. 
 CDA focuses on ‘‘the role of discourse in the (re)production of challenge of dominance’’ (Van Dijk, 
1993, p. 249, emphasis in original). This method considers meaning to be socially constructed by rival social 
and political actors. CDA is concerned with three questions about public discourse: How do people access it? 
What collectively shared representations—‘‘social cognitions’’ (Van Dijk, 1993, p. 257)—of prevalent social 
relations dominate discourse in a given context? And, what is the resulting structure of discourse? CDA 
focuses on ‘‘elites and their discursive strategies’’ (Van Dijk, 1993, p. 250), which makes it a well-suited 
methodology for this study, where most of the data consist of statements by the Saudi elite (clerics, journalists, 
royals, etc). In brief, this study used institutional analysis and CDA to analyze rival discourses and their 
interactions with overlapping institutional, social, and political environments. It strives to answer two research 
questions: 
 
 R1: Why has Star Academy been so intensely controversial in Saudi Arabia? 
 
 After all, this is an Arabic-language program produced by a Lebanese network whose satellite channel 
is half-owned by Saudi investors, featuring Arab contestants. That this ‘‘Arab’’ cultural production would 
trigger a controversy shriller than previous outcries about ‘‘foreign’’ programs calls for more research. At the 
very least, the fact that some within the Saudi elite supported the show suggests that there are contradictory 
forces at work in Saudi Arabia and undermines the view that Saudi society is arch-conservative across the 
board. This leads to the second research question: 
 
 R2: What does the Star Academy controversy reveal about Saudi politics, which are usually highly secretive? 
 
 To address these questions, it is first necessary to explain the connection between Saudi national 
politics and the Arab satellite television industry, the subject of the following section. 
 
Saudi politics and the Arab media revolution 
 
The cradle of Islam and an energy superpower, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is ruled by the Al-Sa‘ud royal 
family whose reign is religiously sanctioned by the Al-Shaykh family of clerics (Abukhalil, 2003; Al-Rasheed, 
2002). The seat of power represented by the Al-Sa‘ud-Al-Shaykh alliance remained relatively unchallenged 
until the 1970s when a rapid growth in oil wealth and urbanization spawned various political formations, two 
of which contested prevailing political arrangements (Al-Rasheed, 2007; Moaddel, 2006), especially after the 
upheaval brought by the 1991 Gulf War and the stationing of American troops on Saudi soil. On the one hand, 
Sahwi Islamists (sahwa means ‘‘awakening’’) believed Saudi Arabia to be insufficiently Islamic and accused 
establishment clerics of selling out to the royal family (Al-Rasheed, 2002; Fandy, 1999). On the other hand, 
liberal activists advocate a more inclusive system that would enshrine political, minority, and women’s rights 
(Al-Rasheed, 2007; Hamzawy, 2006).  
 Saudi Arabia has no public institutional mechanisms for contesting the monarchy, because 
establishment Wahhabiya, a branch of Sunni Islam that is ‘‘religiously dogmatic, socially conservative and 
politically acquiescent’’ (Al-Rasheed, 2007, p. 5), validates royal authority over political and economic issues 
in exchange for clerical control over the social, educational, and cultural spheres (Abukhalil, 2003; Al-Bishr, 
2007). According to state Wahhabiya, rulers can only be questioned discretely and deferentially (Al-Rasheed, 
2007). However, rival conservative and liberal activists have since the 1990s submitted several petitions to the 
king advocating various reforms (Abukhalil, 2003; Al-Rasheed, 2007; Fandy, 1999), leading then de facto 
ruler and Crown Prince Abdullah to launch the National Dialogue Forum in June 2003, 2 years before he 
became the sixth King of Saudi Arabia in August 2005. 
 Participation in the National Dialogue Forum is restricted to a group of individuals handpicked by the 
king periodically to discuss issues under the auspices of the King Abdul Aziz Center for National Dialogue, 
whose president is the king himself. This reflects the secrecy endemic in Saudi politics: When in September 
2005 King Abdullah met with a group of business and intelligentsia women, the tenor of their discussion was 
not revealed (Al-Rasheed, 2007). Although over the years the dialogues have become more public—some 
sessions were even televised, C-SPAN style, by state owned Saudi TV—and inclusive (Bundagji, 2008), 
heretofore only ‘‘hundreds of Saudimen and women have engaged in six National Dialogue forums’’ (Qusti, 
2007). In contrast, recurring controversies over popular culture have become prolonged public contests that 
draw a large number of clerics, intellectuals, journalists, and royals, and, most importantly, affective 
involvement by the Saudi public (Al-Bishr, 2007; Kraidy, 2007). 
 These polemics are no longer restricted to Saudi public discourse. Rather, they have a broader, pan-
Arab resonance because of extensive Saudi involvement in Arabic-language media throughout the Middle East 
(Abukhalil, 2003; Azour, 2006; Boyd, 2001; Cochrane, 2007; Hammond, 2007). Saudi businessmen who 
began acquiring pan-Arab media in the 1970s (Boyd, 2001) now control Al-Hayat and Asharq-Al-Awsat 
(Alterman, 1998), the multichannel MBC group based in Dubai, several religious radio and television stations, 
in addition to stakes in various channels based in Egypt (al-Risala) and Lebanon (LBC) (see Kraidy & Khalil, 
2007). Although there are other regional production centers, whether established like Egypt or emergent like 
Syria, Arab media is characterized by large-scale Saudi ownership (Kraidy & Khalil, in press). 
 While Saudi moguls have substantial stakes in pan-Arab media, Lebanese professionals occupy key 
ranks in advertising (Raveendran, 2004) and journalism (El-Oifi, 2006), especially as directors, producers, and 
managers in entertainment television (Kraidy, 2007; Le Pottier, 2003). The Saudi media buying spree snapped 
up numerous Lebanese journalists and advertising executives who fled their country during the 1975–1990 
Civil War after earning professional experience in the myriad unlicensed television stations spawned by that 
war (Abukhalil, 2003; J. Al-Khazen, personal communication, June 7, 2005; Boyd, 2001). In the 1990s, 
budding Saudi television channels lured this large pool of media workers, many of whom remain with their 
Saudi employers (J. Al-Khazen, personal communication, June 7, 2005; M. Al-Nowaiser, personal 
communication, June 10, 2005). During the same period, LBC, originally launched in 1985 by a Christian-
nationalist wartime militia (Boyd, 1991; Kraidy, 1998), received an infusion of Saudi investments (Kraidy, 
2007). The ensuing success of Lebanese productions with Saudi viewers has nurtured an alliance of Saudi 
capital and Lebanese talent—the Saudi–Lebanese connection: Saudi capital funds Lebanese productions that 
are designed at least partly for Saudi viewers (S. Alavanthian, personal communication, June 30, 2004; A. 
Bibi, personal communication, June 5, 2004; S. Qandil, personal communication, June 2, 2004; see also Al-
Rasheed, 2008). The liberal ethos of Lebanese productions has contributed to polemics over television in Saudi 
Arabia, but Saudi interelite rivalries (see Kraidy, 2007) and business interests have prevented Saudi media 
owners and investors from dictating uniform programming. 
 
Women, national identity, and media policy in Saudi Arabia 
 
Saudi national identity is deeply imbued with Wahhabiya’s focus on purifying Saudi Islam from foreign 
influence (Al-Rasheed, 2002, 2007). Anxieties about the social impact of technology, with its ability to move 
ideas across boundaries, are commonplace in Saudi history, regularly causing contention since 
‘‘modernization’’ was declared a national objective in the 1930s (Al-Ghaddhami, 2005; Al-Rasheed, 2007; 
Boyd, 1970). Since then the television, Internet, and camera-equipped mobile telephones have caused various 
controversies (Kraidy, 2006). 
 The Saudi royal family introduced television in the 1960s to modernize a vast country with a fractious 
tribal population and to have a propaganda tool, important for a regime reeling at the time from a hostile media 
campaign from revolutionary Egypt (Boyd, 1970). Clerics dropped initial objections to television when they 
gained a key policy-making role resulting in strict censorship rules consistent with the tenets of Wahhabiya 
(see Boyd, 1999). Since then, prohibitions have included ‘‘Sceneswhich arouse sexual excitement;’’ ‘‘Women 
who appear indecently dressed, in dance scenes, or in scenes which show overt acts of love;’’ ‘‘Women who 
appear in athletic games or sports;’’ ‘‘Alcoholic drinks or anything connected with drinking;’’ ‘‘Derogatory 
references to any of the ‘Heavenly Religions;’’’ ‘‘Treatment of other countries with praise, satire, or 
contempt;’’ ‘‘References to Zionism;’’ ‘‘Material meant to expose the monarchy;’’ ‘‘All immoral scenes;’’ 
‘‘References to betting or gambling;’’ and ‘‘Excessive violence’’ (Shobaili, 1972, as cited in Boyd, 1999, p. 
164). 
 Media regulations reflect an unambiguous focus on gender issues because theseparation of men and 
women lies at the heart of the Saudi social order (Al-Rasheed, 2007; Doumato, 1992). The ideal of the pious 
woman is central to Saudi identity: It is the bearer of authentic Islam as imagined by proponents ofWahhabiya 
(Doumato, 1992). As a result, Saudi social space is compartmentalized in order to prevent ikhtilat, or gender 
mixing, and a sharp boundary between private and public space governs male–female interactions. Women are 
allowed in public space only in the company of a male guardian; they are banned from driving automobiles 
and until recently they were banned from traveling outside of the country without the company of a male 
relative. ‘‘[T]he official version of the ideal woman’’ sits at the core of the Saudi identity because it ‘‘defines 
the particular Muslim society of Saudi Arabia as something distinct from and morally superior to the West, as 
well as being superior to other Muslim countries where women are less rigidly separated’’ (Doumato, 1992, p. 
33). 
 By focusing on protecting the ideal Islamic woman as a bearer of the nation’s identity, television 
censorship reflects the importance of rituals like gender segregation for the public performance of Islamic piety 
(Al-Rasheed, 2007). Wahhabi dogma focuses on the most detailed and intimate aspects of everyday life such 
as ‘‘women’s attire, false eyelashes, sports centres, body massage, hair removal’’ because of the ‘‘. . . the 
centrality of ritual practices in Wahhabi thought and expertise, used to control the social sphere’’ (Al-Rasheed, 
2007, pp. 54–55, emphasis added). For this reason, television is crucial to the royal family that uses it to exalt 
its ostensible piety through broadcasting religious programs and rituals whose ‘‘repetitiveness and regularity of 
[religious television programs] confirm Saudi society as obsessively concerned with the ritualistic aspect of 
Islam . . . [reducing] a world religion to a set of prohibited and permissible actions for the sake of 
demonstrating the religiosity of power’’ (Al-Rasheed, 2007, p. 60). Television is a powerful ritual instrument 
in the hand of Saudi Arabia’s rulers. 
 Nonetheless, as the remainder of this article strives to demonstrate, Saudi Arabia’s entanglement in 
the transnational Arab media landscape diminished the reach of televised promonarchy religious rituals by 
providing Saudis with programming alternatives. Because pan-Arab advertising focuses on the wealthy Saudi 
audience (F. Abbas, personal communication, June 9, 2005; Cochrane, 2007; Kraidy, 2007; K. Darouny, 
personal communication, July 9, 2001; Mtayni, personal communication, May 31, 2004; S. Qandil, personal 
communications, June 2, 2004 and June 22, 2005), channels target Saudi viewers from Beirut, Cairo, and 
Dubai, locations where Saudi censors do not hold sway. Indeed, seeds of the Saudi upheaval around Star 
Academy reside in the special relationship between Saudi Arabia and LBC—a fulcrum of the Saudi–Lebanese 
connection. Ever since LBC began satellite broadcasting in 1996, Saudi investments (first from mogul Saleh 
Kamel, then mostly from Prince Al-Waleed Bib Talal) have enabled it to be a market leader. In addition to a 
news-gathering joint operation with Al-Hayat, owned by Saudi prince Salman Bin-‘Abdulaziz, LBC’s 
association with Al-Waleed bin Talal culminated in 2007 when LBC merged with Al-Waleed’s Rotana. LBC’s 
screen aesthetic reflects a socially liberal Lebanese ethos, characterized by ostensible mimicry of Western 
consumer lifestyles, slick production values, informality in newscasts and talk-shows, language mixing 
between Arabic, French, and sometimes English, and, most importantly, the ubiquity of alluringly dressed 
women (Kraidy, 2006). 
 If the Islamic ideal of the pious woman is central to Saudi Arabia’s national identity, the consumer 
ideal of the ‘‘Western-looking,’’ uninhibited woman is central to LBC’s corporate identity. When this author 
asked LBC’s General Manager Pierre el- Daher to distill his channel’s profile, he said ‘‘We are a general 
entertainment channel without social inhibitions’’ (P. el-Daher, personal communication, June 30, 2004). 
An ostensibly liberal mettle was manifest in LBC’s pre-satellite era (1985–1996), belied in primetime 
broadcasts of lingerie ads with some nudity. Commoditized femininity became LBC’s hallmark in the satellite 
era (after 1996) when Saudi tourists would reportedly drive to LBC headquarters northeast of Beirut and ask to 
meet Haifa, the suggestively attired star of an aerobics show (not to be confused with pop star Haifa Wehbi). In 
a revealing double-entendre, Arabs refer to LBC as elbessee, Arabic for ‘‘get dressed’’ (author field notes). 
LBC’s commoditization of the female form is central to its ability to create programs mixing high production 
values, lightheartedness, boldness, and titillation because, as LBC’s then Director of Programming told this 
author, these characteristics attract viewers, most importantly viewers from Saudi Arabia (S. Alavanthian, 
personal communication, June 30, 2004). Controversies ensue in Saudi Arabia because the hypervisibility of 
women’s bodies on LBC clashes head on with Wahhabiya’s compulsive invisibility of the female body in 
public space. It is against this institutional and social backdrop that the Star Academy controversy in Saudi 
Arabia is best understood. 
 
Star Academy: A contentious media event 
 
LBC adapted Star Academy from an Endemol format and promoted it as the harbinger of Arab ‘‘reality TV’’—
ostensibly unscripted, featuring amateurs, and involving viewer participation. From a pan-Arab pool of 3000 
applicants, LBC selected 16 finalists, 8 women and 8 men, who agreed to be sequestered for 4 months 
(December 2003 to April 2004) in ‘‘The Academy,’’ a four-story building near LBC headquarters in Adma, a 
Christian North eastern suburb of Beirut, Lebanon. They were monitored by 60 cameras in a logistically 
complex operation involving up to 250 staff (R. Sa‘d, personal communication, July 5, 2004). Hailing from 
Egypt, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and Syria, the tullab (students) attended performing 
arts ‘‘classes’’—LBC framed the show as pedagogical. On Monday, a jury of media personalities announced 
two ‘‘nominees,’’ (the English word was used) whose names and photographs were posted on television and 
on the show’s website, launching a weeklong round of pan-Arab mobile phone and Internet voting to expel one 
of the nominees. Star Academy suffused LBC’s schedule with a nightly, 1-hour ‘‘access’’ (again, in English) 
show summarizing the day’s event, a weekly, 2-hour Friday ‘‘prime’’ (English) featuring live performances by 
contestants, at the end of which voting results are announced and the losing contestant exits ‘‘The Academy.’’ 
Viewers could peek inside the academy 24/7 for 4 months by watching LBC Reality, a dedicated satellite 
channel (R. Sa‘d, personal communication, July 5, 2004; author field notes). 
 Star Academy was a media event in Saudi Arabia, so popular (Murshid, 2004) that its broadcasts 
achieved record ratings (J. Fakhreddine, personal communication, June 1, 2004; S. Qandil, personal 
communication, June 2, 2004), emptied streets in major cities like Jidda and Riyadh (F. Abbas, personal 
communication, June 9, 2005), animated debates, inspired Mosque sermons, and widely distracted students 
from focusing on final exams in May 2004 (Al-Humaydan, 2005).Unlike Dayan and Katz’s understanding of 
media events as milestones of social solidarity (1992), Star Academy was a contentious media event that 
generated wide-ranging rhetorical battles. Even the types of events that Dayan and Katz understand as 
‘‘contests’’ operate under strict rules (see Dayan & Katz, 1992, chapter 2). In contrast, a contentious media 
event like Star Academy changes the rules of participation in the event, which make them closer to Fiske’s 
definition of a media event as ‘‘a point of maximum discursive visibility . . . [and] maximum turbulence . . . 
[that] invites intervention and motivates people to struggle to redirect some of the currents flowing through it 
to serve their interests’’ (Fiske, 1996, p. 8, see also Liebes and Katz, 2007, on disruptive media events). 
Rival Saudi social actors used the Star Academy controversy as ‘‘a site of popular engagement and 
involvement’’ (Fiske, 1996, p. 8), deploying strategic discourse and betraying various strands of dissent 
against clerico-royal power. 
 
Conservative responses: Combating ‘‘Satan Academy’’ 
In Saudi Arabia and other Islamic societies, questions from the faithful often prompt clerics to promulgate 
religious rulings called fatwas. In response to numerous questions from Saudi viewers on whether it was 
religiously haram (prohibited) or halal (permitted) to watch and participate in Star Academy, the ‘‘Permanent 
Committee for Scientific Research and the Issuing of Fatwas,’’ the highest such Saudi body, onMarch 30, 
2004 issued a dedicated fatwa (Standing Committee for Scientific Research and the Issuing of Fatwas, 2004). 
It prohibited watching, discussing, voting in, or participating in Star Academy, and exhorted businessmen not 
to finance this type of programs. The committee’s main charge was that Star Academy violated and subverted 
Islamic principles because it carried ‘‘a number of serious evils’’ such as: 
 
Free mixing of the sexes. . . . the main idea of [Star Academy and similar shows] is mixing between 
the sexes and removing all barriers between them, as well as the wanton display and unveiling on the 
part of women displaying their charms, which leads to much evil . . . Blatant promotion of 
immorality. . . by making 
[Muslims] get used to seeing these shameful scenes that provoke desires and by distancing them from 
good morals and virtue (Standing Committee for Scientific Research and the Issuing of Fatwas, 2004, 
emphasis added).  
 
Like Saudi censorship guidelines (Shobaili, 1972, as cited in Boyd, 1999), the fatwa is most concerned with 
women and their interaction with men. But unlike media regulations, which concern institutions, the fatwa 
calls upon believers directly and as individuals to actively oppose Star Academy: ‘‘It is not sufficient for you to 
abstain from watching these shows,’’ the fatwa stipulates, ‘‘[y]ou should also advise and remind those whom 
you know watch them or take part in them in any way, because that comes under the heading of cooperating in 
righteousness and piety, and forbidding one another to engage in sin and transgression’’ (Standing Committee 
for Scientific Research and the Issuing of Fatwas, 2004). In a similar vein, an Imam (prayer leader) at Mecca’s 
Great Mosque called Star Academy a ‘‘Weapon of Mass Destruction’’ (Middle East Online, 2004). 
 Conservative reactions to Star Academy were not restricted to establishment clerics. Sahwi activists 
distributed fiery audio-cassette sermons titled ‘‘Satan Academy’’ (Abbas, 2005). Other radical clerics 
circulated a cassette tape called SARS Academy, comparing the reality show to the virulent virus that caused 
severe acute respiratory syndrome (Abbas, 2005). Even the relatively liberal Al-Riyadh published hostile op 
eds entitled ‘‘Star Academy: A Corrupt Satellite Industry’’ (Al-Moussa, 
2006) and ‘‘Star Academy . . . The Other Terrorism’’ that claimed that ‘‘modesty and morals vanish when . . . 
young men and women get together, wearing clothes that provide modesty for very few parts of their bodies . . 
. express confusion about . . . authentic identity and culture . . . ’’ (Al-‘Enezi, 2005). Deriding Star Academy’s 
pedagogical pretensions, the author concluded: 
 
The objectives of this so-called ‘Star Academy’ . . . are progress and knowledge!! . . . which means . . 
. trampling the dearest thing that you have . . . your timeless (religious) beliefs and principles!! . . . 
there is a hand grabbing morals and tossing them aside and offering us modern art reeking of the smell 
of moral terrorism!! (Al-‘Enezi, 2005). 
 
Viewing Star Academy as a harbinger of foreign values and therefore a threat to Saudi authenticity, the column 
is typical of conservative attacks, beginning with concerns about cultural decline and social confusion, 
subsequently invoking religion as a definitive argument against the show’s imputed moral defects (see also Al-
Dakhil, 2005, Al-Dawyan, 2005; Standing Committee for Scientific Research and the Issuing of Fatwas, 
2004). 
 
Liberal responses: Embracing social change 
In sharp contrast, other writers in Saudi newspapers praised Star Academy as an alternative to extremist 
dogma(Nasrallah, 2004), an invitation to dialogue (Al-Jabban, 2005), or for inspiring lessons in democracy: In 
a column titled ‘‘Star Academy’s Democracy,’’ a Saudi female journalist (Al-Bishr, 2005) wrote the 
following: 
 
Arabs shied away from voting because . . . [of fraud] . . . until satellite television . . . corrupted us by inciting 
us to vote: ‘‘vote, you are the referee’’ . . . ‘‘nominate your favorite candidate’’ . . . the [Arab] viewer has 
become obsessed with voting . . . because results resemble election results in the United States, 
where unlike Arab elections, nobody wins by 99.99%, but rather by logical proportions. 
 
Writing during the first municipal (local) elections in Saudi Arabia, she concludes that ‘‘therefore, the fire of 
voting is ablaze among . . . Saudi citizens, men and women, old and young, who enthusiastically voted in the 
Star Academy show . . . the (Saudi) municipal elections . . . can benefit from the experiment of Star Academy, 
using procedures that demonstrate to voters that their vote has value . . . ’’ (Al-Bishr, 2005). 
 Other liberals were exasperated by the conservatives’ excessive reaction to Star Academy. Another 
woman, a journalist writing in the Jidda-based Arab News, asked: ‘‘How vulnerable we must be if a TV 
program can ‘destroy our moral standards’, and teach out children bad things. If our society is that weak, then 
we have every reason to stop all TV programs, close our doors and windows and stay at home . . .’’ 
(Mishkhas, 2004). She then narrated the following anecdote:  
 
A mother of three boys who are avid watchers of Star Academy told me: ‘‘I know it’s a silly program, 
but kids need some fun. Society does not provide them with much to do, so what do they do with their 
spare time? Can they go to clubs? No. Can they go to public libraries? No. So what are they supposed 
to do? I saw herpoint . . . What do we give our teenagers? We give them everything except the right 
guidance and venues to expend their energies! So if we stop Star Academy . . . will our problems end? 
Will we turn into a utopian society?’’ (Mishkhas, 2004) 
 
In contrast to Wahhabiya’s focus on censorship and prohibition, liberal columnists used the Star Academy 
polemic to discuss alternatives for Saudi youth (in another column, ‘Mishkhas (2005) argued that moral 
arguments against Star Academy are akin to ‘‘tilting at the wrong windmills’’). 
 A major liberal voice hailed from within the royal family. Prince Al-Waleed Bin Talal of mixed 
Saudi–Lebanese parentage, nephew of King ‘Abdallah and major stakeholder in LBC’s satellite channel, 
supported Star Academy. Al-Waleed was clearly one of the ‘‘businessmen’’ alluded to in the anti-Star 
Academy fatwa. Al-Waleed, who through a spokesperson issued a ‘‘no comment’’ comment on the fatwa, sent 
his private plane to Beirut to bring Hisham ‘Abdel Rahman back to Saudi Arabia after the young Saudi won 
Star Academy 2 (‘‘Hisham is,’’ 2005), causing nationwide late night celebrations in the kingdom 
(Abushaybah, 2005; Al-Osaimi, 2005). Bin Talal’s commercial interests were on display when ‘Abdel Rahman 
was photographed brandishing the Star Academy trophy while standing next to a large logo of Rotana, the 
prince’s Arabic music label and television empire (‘‘Hisham is,’’ 2005) that merged with LBC’s satellite 
operation in 2007. When the Saudi religious police jailed ‘Abdel Rahman for ‘‘sparking an indecent 
gathering’’ after spotting teenage girls hugging and kissing him at a shopping mall in Jidda (Al-Matrafi, 2005), 
the prince secured his release and invited ‘Abdel Rahman to visit him at his palace, with pictures of the 
meeting appearing in several Saudi newspapers (‘‘Hisham is,’’ 2005; Prince Al-Waleed, 2005). Unwavering, 
Al-Waleed stated ‘‘we will continue our journey in supporting Saudi youth and discovering and nurturing their 
artistic and athletic talents’’ (Prince Al-Waleed, 2005), subsequently offering Hisham a lead role in the first 
indigenously produced Saudi movie, further flaunting his disregard for establishment Wahhabiya (‘‘Saudis 
become,’’ 2006). 
 The Saudi novelist and columnist Turki Al-Hamad has been a prominent liberal in this continuing 
debate over Saudi modernity and authenticity, whose advocacy of ‘‘getting rid of that obsessive fear over the 
loss of our identity and culture’’ (Al- Hamad, 2001, p. 13), clashes head on with Wahhabiya’s obsession with 
protecting Saudi purity and authenticity from alien influence. In an op-ed in the Dubai-based al-Bayan, Al-
Hamad (2005) wrote thus:  
 
The concept of cultural invasion is premised on [the] concept . . . of ‘‘authenticity,’’ assuming that 
there is a complete or pure authenticity that needs to be preserved in the face of ‘‘intellectual 
invasion’’ . . . if everyone adopted that definition of authenticity and therefore the concept of cultural 
invasion, humans would not have gone beyond the stone age . . . Pure authenticity is an illusion equal 
to the illusion of the pure race . . . It is usually the weakest party in intercultural . . . relations that 
invokes the concept of cultural invasion . . . it expresses its fear, anxiety, and weakness in terms like 
cultural invasion, similar to a military invasion, and it takes up the cause of authenticity . . . all these 
are defense mechanisms . . . [that] do not reflect the dynamic nature of culture . . . Isolation is in truth 
the weakest protection . . . even if it appears to be the strongest. History tells us that.’’ (Al-Hamad, 
2005) 
 
Because of Al-Hamad’s challenge to Wahhabi norms of authenticity, clerics repeatedly declared him a kafir 
(infidel), but king Abdullah took him under his protection and reportedly offered him his own pen (Al-
Rasheed, 2007) in a symbolically potent protective, but also co-optive gesture—Al-Hamad eschews Saudi 
politics in the regular column he currently publishes in Asharq Al-Awsat (he mostly writes toothless columns 
about Iraq or Arab–Western relations). Nonetheless, the Saudi culture wars continue with Al-Hamad voicing 
concerns for his safety after a recent fatwa declared that liberals were not true Muslims (‘‘Saudi fatwa,’’ 2007). 
        For a period of time, the Star Academy controversy became an important forum for this ongoing struggle. 
Not only did conservatives and liberals duel on op-ed pages, but an official fatwa underscored that some 
members of the royal family who are close to the establishment clerics were opposed to the show while others, 
like Al Waleed Bin Talal, were not. In a country devoid of political institutions where such issues could be 
publicly deliberated (see Al-Rasheed, 2007), the Star Academy battle royal publicized contending views of 
Saudi identity and authenticity. More importantly, Star Academy’s widespread popularity in spite of intense 
polemic suggest that many Saudis may be ambivalent toward both conservative and liberal poles, an issue 
examined in the following section. 
 
Neither liberal nor conservative? The ambivalence of the Saudi public 
On March 7, 2004, as the first season of Star Academy was entering its final month, LBC’s Sunday night talk-
show Al-Hadath focused on Star Academy (Al-Hadath, 2004). The discussion reiterated arguments already 
represented in this article, but a report from Saudi Arabia suggests a new dimension. In a spacious coffee 
house Saudi men were seated in the background sipping coffee, smoking shishas (water pipes), or eating while 
watching Star Academy on a wide screen; the reporter declares that ‘‘Opinions differed on the Saudi street 
which appeared to be more opposed to than supportive of Star Academy’’ and explains that ‘‘Saudi society is 
conservative and its customs and traditions may not be compatible with the program’’ (Al-Hadath, 2004). 
Then, one by one, the Saudimen walked to the foreground of the coffee house to answer the reporter’s queries 
and made statements: 
 
Interviewee 1: Star Academy is successful with the public in all criteria, but it has some defects and some 
points of contention, especially the transfer of Western culture, like kissing and gender mixing. 
Interviewee 2: Star Academy has supporters and opponents. I am an opponent because in all sincerity Star 
Academy has gender mixing between male and female students. 
       Reporter: The participation of the Saudi youth Mohammed Al-Khalawi in the program stirred interest 
among Saudis, who followed the program and nominated contestants, in solidarity with their 
compatriot. 
Interviewee 3: Of course there was Mohammed Al-Khalawi [but] there was exaggeration in showing immoral 
things. However I cannot say that the program is not successful and I hope it will continue and 
that there will be a part 2, and I hope that the number of participants from Gulf countries will 
increase. 
        Reporter: The program has created conflict within families, where fathers and mothers are worried that 
their sons and daughters are exposed to behavior that is not compatible with their convictions. 
Interviewee 4: Frankly Star Academy is a successful program . . . on all criteria, but there are some 
reservations. (The camera pans back and forth on the all-male audience watching the show, 
including previous interviewees.) Because people watch it every day, it creates problems 
between parents and the fans of the program, especially teenagers; at home there are problems 
between my two parents and my brothers and sisters, ‘‘watch it! Do not watch it!’’ . . . Surely, 
however, frankly, as an idea and as a program Star Academy is successful. 
Interviewee 5: I am among the opponents of this program, and I do not support it. Obviously we know the 
view of Islamic Shari‘a (religious law) on gender mixing. (Star Academy contestants) are on the 
air live 24 hours a day, and there are love relationships. I cannot see myself in that program. 
        Reporter: There is a lot of controversy over Star Academy on the Saudi street, to the extent that we can 
say that this program ‘filled the world’ and preoccupied people, both those who reject it and 
those who accept it.’’ (Al-Hadath, 2004) 
 
 Although women writers such as Al-Bishr (2005), Mishkhas (2004, 2005), Al-Dabib (2005), Al-
Dakhil (2005), and others articulated defenses and critiques of Star Academy, the fact that no Saudi women 
participated in the exchange quoted above reflects the fact that public space in Saudi Arabia is a male domain. 
Nonetheless, the excerpt shows that a slice of the male Saudi public was clearly ambivalent about Star 
Academy, as young men took turns facing the camera, said something like ‘‘I like it, but I have moral 
reservations,’’ then regained their seats and resumed watching.Were they simply voicing moral objections to 
play ‘‘as if,’’ pretending to follow Wahhabi prescriptions? Or were they watching Star Academy, in spite of 
genuine moral reservations, because ‘‘everyone else’’ was? 
 Partial answers reside in recent surveys that found the Saudi public to be ambivalent about social 
issues (Moaddel, 2006; Rheault, 2007). Although ‘‘[r]eligion, women, and democracy are among the most 
contested categories in the intellectual debates about the future of the kingdom’’ (Moaddel, 2006, p. 92), 71% 
of Saudis, the survey reveals, are in favor of democracy and 59% agree that a working mother can establish as 
warm a relationship with her children as a stay-at-home mother. In contrast, 23% of Saudis disagreed that men 
make better political leaders than women and 81% of Saudis agreed that a woman must always obey her 
husband. Only 5% disagreed on that last question. Among the survey’s rather unexpected findings is that 
overall ‘‘the Saudi public appears to be less religious than Egyptians and Jordanians’’ (Moaddel, 2006, 
emphasis added). More recently, a Gallup poll found the Saudi public to be even more liberal, with majorities 
supporting various freedoms for women: 55% of Saudimen and 66% of Saudi women support women’s right 
to drive a car (which has been legally forbidden since 1991); 75% of men and 82% of women support women 
having jobs outside of the home, a gender gap of 7 compared to 21 points in Egypt (Rheault, 2007). The same 
poll found that 83% of Saudi men and 84% of Saudi women agree that ‘‘women should be allowed to keep all 
earnings from their jobs for themselves and that their husbands should support their households in full,’’ with 
percentages on this issue in Egypt standing at 48% for women and 51% of men (percentages of Europeans of 
both genders who agreed to this statement were 58% in France, 38% in Germany, and 34% in the United 
Kingdom!) (Rheault, 2007). 
 If Saudis are less religious than is commonly assumed, then attitudes and official policy towards 
gender are at least partly inspired by social norms that overlap but are not subsumed into religious beliefs and 
practices (Doumato, 1992). Although couched in religious language, these norms hark back to older political 
bases. According to Doumato (1992), in the past piety was measured by men’s action, behavior, and dress. The 
shift to women’s piety as a symbol of a virtuous society occurred because of political expediency, because it 
appealed to Saudis across religion, region, and social class. Thus ‘‘the separation and nonpublic presence of 
women are a way of making Islam visible’’ because ‘‘[t]he public invisibility of women has become a way to 
display one’s faith, to make religion something tangible that can be measured by others’’ (Doumato, 1992, p. 
45). 
 Patriarchy and political expediency, rather than strictly religion, explains gender segregation, a central 
tenet of an ostensibly religious discourse that is in fact a political idiom of governance: ‘‘[T]he Wahhabi 
‘ulama,’’ wrote Al-Rasheed (2007), ‘‘contributed to the consolidation of a state that is politically secular and 
socially religious’’ (p. 57). Policies towards women—including health and employment benefits—are framed 
in religious terms to win legitimacy (Doumato, 1992). More importantly, gender separation is a royal emblem 
of religiosity. During the turbulent years of 1979 and 1980, when the Saudi regime faced armed dissent, and 
then again in the 1990s when Saudi rulers had to validate the presence of American troops in the 1991 Gulf 
war, many fatwas and police actions focused on gender separation, illustrating how a focus on gender deflects 
political tensions (Al-Rasheed, 2007; Doumato, 1992; see also Al-Bishr, 2007). 
 
Reality TV and the redefinition of authenticity 
 
What specifically about Star Academy struck such a sensitive chord in Saudi Arabia? As already explained, 
one answer can be found in the paradoxical relationship between LBC and Wahhabiya’s view on gender 
segregation, the former making women’s bodies hypervisible, the latter striving to make the female form 
invisible. Featured nightly on Star Academy, images of young Arab and mostly Muslim men and women 
suggestively dressed, dancing, hugging, and singing together on stage or in their common house have 
provoked controversy because Star Academy displays a lifestyle that breaches the Saudi prohibition on ikhtilat, 
the illicit mixing of men and women. Women not only dress immodestly; they touch men physically, and sing 
and dance; they also publicly disagree and argue with the men on the show, compete with them, and even 
sometimes beat them in various competitions. By being, in the words of one Saudi critic ‘‘A Sincere Invitation 
to Ikhtilat’’ (Al-Dawyan, 2005), Star Academy offers an alternative social reality imbued with women’s 
agency, albeit contrived and commoditized, and thus inimical to Saudi definitions of a social order. This is 
compounded by LBC promotions touting the ‘‘real’’ aspect of the ‘‘reality TV’’ show, which spurred 
vehement objections from clerics infuriated by the claim that Star Academy represented reality. As detailed in 
the following section, there are two other important reasons behind the polemic: First, reality TV lured Saudi 
viewers to hybrid cultural forms; second, Star Academy individuated authenticity. 
 
Fracturing reality: The lure of the hybrid 
According to Garcia-Canclini (1998) (p. 2), ‘‘the uncertainty about the meaning and value of modernity 
derives not only from what separates nations, ethnic groups, and classes, but also from the sociocultural 
hybrids in which the traditional and the modern are mixed.’’ Whereas Arab culture offers myriad examples of 
cultural mixture, satellite television gives Arabs some of their most public, and therefore most controversial, 
sociocultural hybrids in the form of format-adapted reality TV programs. As culturally ambiguous categories, 
these shows muddle identity and authenticity and confound the boundaries between the domestic and the 
foreign, between the Arab and the alien (see Kraidy, 2005).  
 Star Academy is all the more controversial because its negation of cultural purity is amplified by its 
unprecedented popularity. As Al-Azmeh (1993) argued, ‘‘[T]he notion of authenticity is not so much a 
determinate concept as it is a node of associations and interpellations, a trope by means of which the historical 
world is reduced to a particular order, and a token that marks off social and political groups and forges and 
reconstitutes historical identities’’ (p. 82). The discourse on authenticity is at the heart of the Wahhabi 
worldview, whose norms and principles focus on gender segregation and cultural purity, enforced through 
ritualistic behavior in prayer, dress, and social relations (Al-Rasheed, 2007; Doumato, 1992). A cultural hybrid 
of the foreign and the native, Star Academy threatens the core of Wahhabiya in two specific ways. It 
crystallizes a radically pluralistic world and compels participants to enact alien social norms. 
 As the Arabic version of a European format, Star Academy is a mixture of multiple cultural 
predilections. The contestants’ demeanor reflects the liberal extreme of Lebanese social mores, themselves 
significantly more relaxed than Saudi customs. In the show, several North African and Lebanese contestants 
speak an Arabic peppered with French words and many performances are in French and English, and 
occasionally in Spanish or even Hindi. English is the show’s logistical lingua franca, as in ‘‘star academy’’ 
and ‘‘nominee,’’ and the notion of ‘‘star’’ itself is very American. Friday primes are carnivalesque spectacles, 
with music and dance tableaux alternating traditional Lebanese musicals, khaliji (Arabian Gulf) songs, a 
Bollywood performance, Broadway musicals, French Cancan, Russian circus numbers, and Chinese dance. 
Various generic elements from distinct cultural registers are recombined in individual performances. From the 
view of Wahhabiya, this radical and hybrid eclecticism invokes the jahiliyya—literally the ‘‘age of 
ignorance’’—the chaotic pre-Islamic era on the Arabian Peninsula characterized by fragile tribal orders and 
fluid gender boundaries, and should therefore be strenuously opposed. 
 By grafting an Arabic language program on a Western format, Star Academy is what Bakhtin (1981) 
would call an ‘‘intentional’’—in contrast to an ‘‘organic’’—hybrid. Unlike organic hybridity, which is 
‘‘unintentional, unconscious hybridization’’ (p. 358), a product of intercultural contact, intentional hybridity is 
‘‘concrete and social’’ (p. 360, emphasis in original). Bakhtin (1981) argues that ‘‘an intentional hybrid is 
precisely the perception of one language by another language’’ and concludes that ‘‘[A]n image of language 
may be structured only from the point of view of another language, which is taken as the norm’’ (p. 359). 
Because Western standards set production norms for Arab reality TV programs, Star Academy depicts not 
merely a fantasy world that viewers watch, but a social world enacted ritualistically through viewing practices. 
Because reality TV claims to represent reality, Star Academy posits a normative social world, exemplifying 
what Mart´ın-Barbero (1993) calls mestizaje, ‘‘the sense of continuities in discontinuity and reconciliations 
between rhythms of life that are mutually exclusive’’ (p. 188). To its critics, Star Academy is neocolonial 
precisely because it asks contestants to ritualistically perform a social world alien to Wahhabiya’s values, with 
‘‘Lebanese’’ social norms acting as intermediary between the Western format and its Saudi viewers. 
 The Western literature articulates authenticity for the most part as a minority discourse (see Mcleod, 
1999). In contrast, invocations of authenticity in Saudi Arabia appear to be a majority discourse. Indeed, the 
influence of Wahhabiya means that an extreme version of the discourse of authenticity, one that emphasizes 
purity and separation from an outside world that is postulated as morally inferior, sits at the core 
of national identity and policy. Star Academy draws Saudi viewers to participate in rituals—watching, voting, 
and so forth—that enact a syncretistic identity, subverting the notion of cultural purity cardinal to Saudi 
identity. The ensuing polemic exposes Wahhabiya’s fear and rejection of the outside world, all the more so 
because the show ritually enacts, and therefore upholds, alien values and norms. 
 
The individuation of cultural authenticity 
Star Academy undermines the prevalent notion of authenticity in a more fundamental way due to formal 
elements of the reality genre whose success largely depends on its ostensible liveness (see Couldry, 2003). The 
claim to reality itself is based on the premise that what viewers see on the screen is spontaneous and 
unrehearsed. Like many other reality shows, the key moments in Star Academy are the points in time when 
participants are caught (by cameras) being their authentic selves. It is precisely when contestants allegedly lose 
sight of the cameras that reality TV reaffirms its claims to reality and liveness. While from the audience’s point 
of view this feature represents one of reality TV’s main attractions, these ‘‘moments of truth’’ in the context of 
reality television’s claim to the real, signal a redefinition of the notion of authenticity from obedience to 
Wahhabi dictates to an individual performance through which the contestant reveals his or her ‘‘true,’’ 
authentic self, validating the whole reality TV enterprise. Star Academy not only conjures up a social order 
inimical to Wahhabiya, it also feats the individual as the locus of identity. 
 This personally experienced, individually performed authenticity lies at the heart of reality TV’s 
presumptive connection to reality (Aslama & Pantti, 2006). Claims to represent reality are fiercely contested in 
Saudi Arabia because establishment Wahhabiya claims a monopoly on representing social reality. In contrast, 
Star Academy turns viewers into witnesses of a reality created by a television genre that itself claims to 
represent reality. Witnessing involves searching one’s memory to extract the details of that eventful moment, 
when the witness was present in space (there) and time (then) and then rendering the event to an audience that 
was not present when the event occurred (Peters, 2001). Viewers experiencing Star Academy as a 24/7 flow 
await the eventful moment—the moment of authenticity—with anticipation. They are, in a sense, witnesses in 
reverse. Unlike witnessing, which is ‘‘retroactive’’ (Peters, 2001, p. 722), the ritualized watching of Star 
Academy is proactive. Whereas witnesses are compelled to produce a verisimilar rendering of a past event, 
reality TV viewers are enthralled by the future possibility of the program going ‘‘off-script.’’ The former calls 
for a narrowing of alternatives to come as close as possible to a necessary ‘‘truth’’; the latter proliferates 
alternatives whose ‘‘authenticity’’ rests on their liveness, hence their contingency. Viewers wait for contestants 
to forget the cameras and ‘‘come out’’ as their true, authentic self, the moment when authenticity comes into 
being (although some contestants become adept actors with contrived ‘‘spontaneous’’ outbursts). Viewing in 
this case is a kind of intense, vigilant, intentional—albeit reverse—witnessing.  
 Reality TV’s transformation of viewers into witnesses to contrived events is controversial because 
witnesses are essential for the legitimization of events. Star Academy viewers therefore become agents in the 
creation of a contemporary social reality that clashes head on with regnant Saudi definitions of authenticity. 
Viewing as witnessing essentially entails the ritual diffusion of the power to define social reality. In Saudi 
Arabia, ritualistic Islam is a dominant preoccupation. As Al-Rasheed (2007) explains, Saudi society ‘‘evolved 
into a community of the faithful who vigorously engage in controlled ‘ibadat (rituals of worship), both 
communal and individual, that are regularly displayed in the public sphere.’’ ‘‘Such display,’’ the author 
continues, ‘‘is strictly controlled, and any deviation is condemned as innovation’’ (p. 59). Star Academy 
depicts alternative rituals of engagements on a popular television show at a time when Wahhabi clerics have 
turned ‘‘[p]rayer, fasting, and pilgrimage . . . into spectacles regularly dramatized on local and satellite 
television channels’’ (Al- Rasheed, 2007, p. 59). Reality TV therefore poses a threat to Wahhabi prescribed 




The Saudi debate over Star Academy is a particularly contentious episode in ongoing Saudi debates about 
modernity, identity, the role of Islam in public life, gender relations, and political participation. On one level, it 
reflects political and social anxieties about the redefinition of national sovereignty in the age of transnational 
media that transcend political borders and cultural boundaries. On another level, the polemic betrays the clash 
between Wahhabiya’s focus on cultural separation and purity on the one hand and the business interests of 
some Saudi princes, which are dependent on trade and exchange that bring various cultural values and 
lifestyles into contact, on the other hand. The debate is also a vivid example of the important public role that 
mediated popular culture can take in a context devoid of public institutions for debate and deliberation (see 
Kraidy, in press, for a detailed theoretical discussion of this issue). In addition to being a catalyst and platform 
for debate, the Star Academy controversy revealed political and social fault lines not only within the Saudi 
social, intellectual, and media elite but also within the ruling clerico-political establishment. As such, the 
controversy is a heuristic tool for understanding political dynamics in Saudi Arabia. Like a seismograph, 
contention surrounding popular culture registers shocks that would have otherwise remained under the surface 
of public discourse. Notably, the ambivalence of the Saudi public on social issues, coupled with elite 
polarization over a combination of hot button issues represented by Star Academy, betrays the absence of a 
national consensus on gender roles, Western influence and the role of religion in public life. Rather, it is likely 
that these issues will continue to be animated by various developments, including controversial media and 
popular culture. 
 Those who consider themselves guardians of Saudi morality perceived Star Academy to be an 
existential threat because the show articulates an alternative social reality, therefore undermining the core 
principles of the prevalent social order. The prohibition on gender mixing lies at the center of the Saudi social 
system and the preservation of an unadulterated Saudi authenticity is a core concern of Wahhabiya’s ultra-
conservative worldview. By creating an environment of unbridled gender and cultural mixing, Star Academy 
posed a direct affront to the most vital components of Saudi authenticity—the country’s existential, and not 
only social, center—defined by the political–religious establishment. Although no Saudi female participated in 
Star Academy, the upheaval created by the show made the displacement of that center visible. The popularity 
and controversy of Star Academy are therefore explained by its articulation of a ‘‘reality’’ that not only clashes 
with the Saudi social order, but subverts its most elemental building blocks. That such a subversion of the 
Wahhabi order resonated so deeply and widely in Saudi society, as Star Academy’s popularity indicates, 
suggests that there is a Saudi constituency for an alternative, more inclusive and less restrictive society. 
 Indeed, the broad participation in the Star Academy debate reflects deep hopes and anxieties related to 
social and political change. In Star Academy liberals glimpsed fleeting visions, even if contrived, of a more 
participatory and inclusive society, one with less clerical influence and a wider margin of individual autonomy. 
In contrast, clerics’ ontic engagement with the formal characteristics of reality TV—discussing and rejecting 
its claims to representing reality—suggests that they understand the new kinds of agency, which become 
possible when viewers become avid fans of programs that are based on ritualistic viewer engagement and 
participation in an environment hegemony through similar mediated rituals. This also suggests that opponents 
of reality TV discern that popular participation in the ritualistic redefinition of authenticity threatens the 
prevalent social order—in that sense Star Academy’s popularity may signal a loosening of Wahhabiya’s grip 
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